A good explanation of the case for HS2

Here is an excellent explanation of the case for HS2. The interesting point made is that the Great Central alignment has a maximum top speed of 110 mph without tilt. But the speaker does not explain whether the whole route is so curvy that it would be limited to 110 mph throughout, or, if there are a few points which are speed-limited, and which could be straightened or by-passed, which would be an obvious thing to do if the route is reinstated. The East Coast Main Line used to have sharp curves at Offord and Selby, but the former was straightened by realignment and the latter by constructing a cut-off route.

The speaker also refers to the need to separate slow and fast trains. However,

• The West Coast Main Line is four track all the way from London to Crewe, apart from the short section between Roade and Rugby, where the slow lines are routed through Northampton.
• The East Coast Main Line is four tracks from London to Peterborough, apart from the Welwyn Garden City bottleneck. 
• The Midland Main Line, which could potentially run all the way to Manchester, used to have two additional tracks for slow train, all the way from London to Trent Junction, near Nottingham. 

The speaker does not explain why a lower operating speed has not been chosen; the cost of building, equipping and operating a railway rises disproportionally once speeds rise above 100 mph. In the UK context, the optimum speed is probably between 125 mph and 140 mph.

High speed does not cost just a little bit more

One of the arguments for HS2 has been that the cost difference between building normal speed and high speed lines is very small. That is not conceivable.

• Minimum permitted curvature limits the choice of route. For a conventional speed railway, old abandoned infrastructure can be used.
• Specification of infrastructure.
• Specification of rolling stock.
• Energy costs.
• Wear and tear.

Summary of points against HS2

• The case on time savings fails on diminishing returns and extra terminal times when the service is only affordable if booking is made in advance for travel on a particular time.
• The case on capacity increase fails on the lower cost of building for 125 mph running. 
• The argument based on the WCML upgrade precedent fails on the grounds that it was a more comprehensive scheme than just the provision of additional tracks. The four-tracking of the Trent Valley line was minimally disruptive. 
• Capacity shortage south of Rugby could be relieved by reinstating the Great Central; additional works may be needed at the approaches to London ie south of Milton Keynes, High Wycombe and Aylesbury. Most of the trackbed between Aylesbury and Rugby is still available.
• The WCML is two-track between Roade and Rugby, as the slow lines are routed via Northampton. There appears to be space for an additional pair of tracks between these points; it would require the construction of an additional tunnel at Kilsby.

In addition

• There is already a second route between London and Birmingham: the GW routes via High Wycombe and via Oxford
• There is a potential second route from London to Manchester: the Midland, which is four-track all the way to Trent. Speed restricted sections with sharp curves have been improved in recent years. Reinstating Ambergate to Buxton completes this, and adds useful local links in the process. 

Which is part of the point. If money is to be spent on the rail system, it is better to invest in schemes which will improve connectivity and journey opportunities, rather than on one big bang project. 

The WCML capacity problem

The capacity shortage is south of Rugby. Going south, at Rugby there converge the two track route from Birmingham and the four tracks of the Trent Valley line which carry trains from Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow. South of Rugby, the West Coast Main Line separates into two routes just two tracks. The fast route goes through Weedon and Kilsby, the slow lines through Northampton. They re-join at Roade and continue as four tracks to Primrose Hill, at the approach to Euston. South of Watford Junction there are, additionally, the two suburban line tracks. From Milton Keynes southwards there is, additionally commuter traffic as well as services which run south of London via Olympia.

The HS2 alternative

This film confirms that the former Great Central alignment southwards from Rugby to Quainton Road, where the route to Aylesbury and London is still intact, remains substantially clear of development and is available for reinstatement as a 125 mph railway. Since, we are told, the reason for HS2 is to increase capacity, and the congestion is mostly south of Rugby, why don't they do the obvious thing and get on with the job? The east-west route can be done at the same time, all for a fraction of the cost of HS2, and in a fraction of the time?

Reinstatement of the connection to the GW main line between Ashendon Junction (north of Princes Risborough) and Grendon Underwood Junction is also feasible, and the connection between Princes Risborough and Aylesbury is still in use. Together with the planned reinstatement of the Oxford to Cambridge line, a useful interchange could be developed at Calvert where the Oxford-Bletchley line passes over the Great Central. When the need is for connectivity, these projects would make a worthwhile and useful package.

The Zombie Train that refuses to die

The Guardian has published a couple more articles against HS2, one by specialist rail commentator Christian Wolmar, and another today by journalist Simon Jenkins.

The main arguments in favour will doubtless be wheeled out by the commentators: the need for capacity and the disruption caused by upgrading existing routes. HST itself will severely disrupt services to Euston during the construction period. Capacity can be increased at a fraction of the cost by a variety of measures, provided that it is accepted that the additional traffic will run at existing speeds.

It is not generally known that the Midland main line is, or was, four track all the way from London to Trent Junction, between Nottingham and Derby. This is because the additional tracks are separate, having been added for coal trains which trundled down to Brent sidings, on the edge of London, from a collection point at Toton in Nottinghamshire, where the Midland Railway build a huge marshalling yard. Beyond Derby, the main line to Manchester was severed between Matlock and Buxton, but the route remains intact and could be reinstated at a relatively modest cost, thereby providing a complete new route to Manchester with connections from the East Midlands.

South of Rugby - ie the most congested part of the West Coast Main Line, an additional route could be created by reinstating the Great Central and its associated connecting lines. There is a need to relieve the very busy section through Rugby, Coventry and Birmingham International, but that could be more usefully provided by constructing some kind of metro system and giving back the main line for the London traffic.

Suppressed HS2 report reveals serious cost concerns

The high-speed rail project may be swept up in the latest railway crisis as a 2012 review released under Freedom of Information shows officials believed it was unaffordable.

Article in Guardian

Midland and Trans-Pennine electrifications shelved

It has just been announced that the Midland Main Line and Trans-Pennine electrifications have been shelved due to rising costs and the need to cut back.

It was inevitable that HS2 would put financial pressure on other rail investment and so it has turned out. In a rational world, the electrification of the Midland, and reopening of the direct line to Manchester, would be a priority

The other drain on finance is the Inter City Express or Incredibly Costly Express, Britain's most expensive train ever, which is replacing stock which is good for another 20 years.

The replacement for the 1980s Pacers will also end up being a money gobbler. It is unlikely that the new trains will cost less than £2 million a vehicle.

It is worth getting this in proportion. In 1955, a new railway carriage cost £5000 - around £250,000 after allowing for inflation, but let us double it for luck and allow £500,000. Of course the 1955 design would not be acceptable today. It would need retention toilets, though these need not be on every vehicle, and power-operated doors, though the power operation could be confined to door closure, combined with a locking system. It would also need to be built to contemporary crashworthiness standards, though these should not add significantly to the cost as crashworthiness is mostly about getting the metal in the right place through careful calculation of the design. There are also development and approvals costs, which can of course be hefty, but a decent production run should spread these reasonably.

Adding all these features should, at the most, give a price tag of £1 million per vehicle. With locomotives available off the peg for around £2.5 million, there is no excuse for the runaway costs of new rolling stock.

The other option which the industry refuses to look at is external combustion locomotives with direct drive. These make it easier to meet the current stringent emission standards and, it is claimed by manufacturer DLM, could be produced at a very competitive price given a sufficiently large order.

No more ferries from UK to Scandinavia

EU environmental regulations have killed the last surviving ferry service.
This will lead to around 100,000 extra annual air journeys.

Even more modest Västlänk alternative

Base from Google maps 
Here is an even less ambitious and expensive way of achieving most of the benefits of Västlänken, the principal aim of which is to improve access to the west side of the city centre. A circular route in both directions, it incorporates some existing tram route, part of a section currently under construction, and about 3km of new route, all on the surface. The most expensive piece of civil engineering would involve replacing or supplementing the bridge over the canal at Skeppbron. With just two additional stops, one outside the Opera House and the other where it crosses Avenyn, close to Heden, it would give a fast route from Järntorget and Haga to the Central Station.

Test the demand first
One of the advantages of this proposal is that the travel demand could be tested at minimal cost, and satisfied without having to wait until 2028, by the simple expedient of running a bus service on the route, initially at rush hours only. In fact, one has to ask why this has never been done? Where is the demand?

Västlänken without tunnels

Base from Google maps
The vote against the Göteborg congestion charge was probably motivated as much by opposition to Västlänken as to the congestion charge itself. This is a hugely expensive project to dig a tunnel in a loop around the city centre, in the some of the most difficult geological conditions imaginable - waterlogged clay alternating with granite. It will take about twelve years to build, result in claims for damage to buildings, involve the destruction of large numbers of mature trees in the city centre and cause immense disruption during the construction period, with huge excavations and massive volumes of spoil to be carted away. It is estimated that it will take sixty years to recover the energy that will be expended in the construction.

There is no justification for it on transport grounds. There are five lines converging on the city, from(locally, clockwise) Uddevalla, Älvängen, Alingsås, Borås and Kungsbacka, four of these being the local sections of the main lines to Strömstad, Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen. There is no obvious choice as to which two lines to connect and, indeed, little demand for cross-city traffic at all, so the only benefit might be to reduce reversals at Göteborg Central. Passengers travelling beyond walking distance from the station change to a tram at Drottningtorget on the south side of the station. This is probably close to capacity. However, there is also a tram stop at Nordstan on the west side of the central station and that carries only one tram route (6), thus it has spare capacity.

The main claim for the route is that it will improve communications to the west side of the city centre. The above diagram shows how this could be achieved at a fraction of the cost and within a fraction of the time by the development of an additional tram route. This would commence with a new tram terminus outside the little-used Liseberg station, with trams timed to connect with the trains. The route would then run to Korsvägen, and turn left along Södra Vägen, taking the Chalmers Tunnel to Chalmers university campus and Salgrenska Hospital, from where it would run to Järntorget. It would then continue along the waterfront, past the opera house and turn left to stop outside the Central station at Nordstan. The route would then run to Polhemplatsen, and then follow the route to the south of Trädgårdsföreningen and back to Järntorget, where it would return to Liseberg by the same route. A second route would follow the loop in an anticlockwise direction ie along Parkgatan, passing Heden. Existing tram route 6 might be diverted along this route to avoid Brunnsparken, and the new direct route might also be used by another line, possibly the 11, which would then stop at Polhemplatsen.

This new construction of tram lines would largely alleviate the current poor access between the Haga area and the Central station.

HS2 costs soaring already

Soaring land costs add 25% to HS2 bill. Article in Property Week

HS3 - the high speed madness gets worse

Reports are that Chancellor George Osborne is pushing a proposal for a high speed line, "HS3", between Manchester and Leeds. This is conclusive proof that the man is clueless. This is a typical politician's response.

There is no advantage in running faster than 100 mph between destinations less than 50 miles apart. There are no further useful time savings to be made. Frequent trains and good local connections are needed. That means a programme of platform-lengthening, junction improvements, and possibly, new routes, but high speed does not come into this. Loading-gauge enhancements to take double-deck trains would be nice to have but the trouble is that the routes on which they could operate would be badly restricted.

Equally important in this context is the need to improve local connections through the development of bus and light rail services, as well as park-and-ride facilities.

Govia gets Thameslink franchise

Govia's award of the Thameslink franchise and the introduction of a new fleet of rolling stock will not solve the problems that have affected this service since it was introduced in 1988.

Thameslink reinstated a service which had last run in 1916. British Rail had been reluctant to re-open the route, arguing that there was no demand. When, in 1986, Chris Green took over what was then the London and South East Sector and re-christened it Network South East, he pursued the re-opening of the route. The trains were packed from day one, showing that it satisfied a long-standing suppressed demand.

However, it has always been a problematic route.The difficulties are inherent in running a long distance service through the middle of London. It is consequently vulnerable to disruptions on both of the main lines over which it runs ie a points failure at Haywards Heath will cause delays in the Bedford area a couple of hours later.

A further difficulty is that the rolling stock has to be designed to inner suburban standards with relatively few seats and plenty of space for standing and circulation. This means that passengers can spend an hour in an uncomfortable seat and may have to stand most of the way. On top of this are the crowds of passengers travelling to and from Gatwick with their luggage. Standing is a shiny new train is no more comfortable than standing in an old one, and in fact the new trains will be little different fundamentally than those they will replace.

The Thameslink (and Crossrail) concepts in the present form are flawed. These routes should be cut back to operate roughly within the area enclosed by the M25. Destinations further from London should be served by dedicated services operating from the London terminals.

Biggest fare dodger in history

"Train bosses have come under fire for not prosecuting a wealthy hedge fund manager who was described as the “biggest fare dodger in railway history”, evading more than £42,000 in train tickets. The City executive is believed to have dodged the fare for the 82-minute commute between the Sussex village of Stonegate and central London for five years.

He exploited a flaw that allowed him to go through barriers at Cannon Street station in London by “tapping out” with an Oyster travelcard. After finally being caught by a ticket inspector, the executive was able to pay £42,550 in dodged fares and £450 in legal costs within three days of being asked to pay up as part of an out-of-court settlement." Daily Telegraph article

One has to admire the guy's ingenuity. One also has to question the competence of the people who set up the system, for not spotting the flaw. Perhaps they should employ him as a consultant to check the security of their systems in future.

Crossrail - one railway for the price of two

Expectations of an imminent start on a new north-south rail line across London have been damped, with the former chief executive of Network Rail warning that no work on “Crossrail 2” will happen in the next decade. (FT article)

The route, on a south-west to north-east axis from Chelsea to Hackney, was first proposed as a tube line in 1901 and has popped up regularly ever since. Now Crossrail was also originally intended to relieve the congested Central Line and the northern part of the Circle Line. This could have been satisfied by building another tube line on roughly the present alignment from Paddington to Stratford. In an easterly direction, it might have continued to, perhaps, Woolwich, and at the westerly end, it might have run to Hammersmith, and possibly, eventually, Heathrow.

The London tube uses small 3.5 metre diameter tunnels and electrification by conductor rail. Crossrail, by contrast, is a full-sized railway with overhead electrification, requiring 6 metre tunnels. Thus, almost four times as much material has to be excavated, and costs cannot be less then double the cost of a tube line.

Thus, for the price of Crossrail 1, Londoners could have had both Crossrail 1 and Crossrail 2 for their money. Thus is the money wasted on over-specified infrastructure. How did this happen?

HS2 threatens wildlife habitats, MPs warn.

The Government should examine the option of the maximum speed being reduced from 225 mph to 185 mph to cut carbon emissions, says the House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee. The report calls for full environmental surveys along the length of the route and ringfencing of cash to preserve habitats. Guardian article.

Yet another re-launch of HS2

Report published today.

HS2 benefits 'made up', economists tell MPs

Government calculations used to justify the £50 billion HS2 scheme were “essentially made up” a former member of Whitehall’s high speed rail advisory panel has told MPs.

Henry Overman, professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics said he had quit the panel after he felt its role had changed from providing independent advice to promoting the project.

Article in Daily Telegraph.

Transport Secretary blocks HS2 report

The transport secretary has blocked the release of a sensitive report believed to undermine the case for the proposed high-speed rail network. Patrick McLoughlin took the unusual step of vetoing the publication of a November 2011 review by the Major Projects Authority, despite the information commissioner saying it should be released after Freedom of Information requests. Read more here.